

JPRS 78486

10 July 1981

USSR Report

CONSUMER GOODS AND DOMESTIC TRADE

No. 17

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

10 July 1981

USSR REPORT
CONSUMER GOODS AND DOMESTIC TRADE

No. 17

CONTENTS

CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

Role of Head Ministries for Production of Consumer Goods Discussed (SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA, 19 Mar 81)	1
Gosplan Official Argues for Smaller Light Industry Enterprises (Ye. Afanasy'evskiy; SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA, 13 Mar 81)	7
Problems Encountered in Establishing, Running Factory Farm (L. Alimpiyev; TRUD, 28 Apr 81)	10
Georgian Product Quality Performance Declines (Editorial; KOMUNISTI, 15 Apr 81)	13
Georgia Risks Losing 'Quality Emblem' Status (B. Makharashvili; KOMUNISTI, 15 Apr 81)	16

CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

ROLE OF HEAD MINISTRIES FOR PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA in Russian 19 Mar 81 p 2

[Roundtable discussion: "The Head Ministry - Its Rights and Responsibility: Problems of Managing Consumer Goods Production"]

[Text] The 26th CPSU Congress posed the challenge of increasing the production of consumer goods and improving their quality. The head ministries responsible for production of particular types of goods have a large part to play in meeting this challenge. They must coordinate all the activities related to the development, siting, and specialization of production and implement a uniform technical policy in the development of new articles and improving their assortment and quality.

How are they fulfilling their responsibilities? What factors are giving them trouble in managing the goods market? What is the best way to carry out the job, stated in the document "Basic Directions," of improving the coordination of consumer goods production? These questions were discussed by important employees of USSR Gosplan, the USSR Ministry of Trade, and the State Committee for Standards and the sectorial industrial ministries at the editors' round table.

[V. Krishchenko, deputy chief of the Main Administration of Cultural and Domestic Trade of the USSR Ministry of Trade]: Cultural-domestic goods today account for 24 percent of all retail trade. If we take just nonfood goods they are one-half. Their production increased 58 percent in the 10th Five-Year Plan. This was in retail prices. In physical terms the gain was more modest.

Why? At first it seemed that after USSR Gosplan had set the general assignment for production of goods we and the head ministries would be able to work out the details of the deliveries by assortment. But this did not happen. The head ministries could not find effective forms of cooperation, not only with us but also with their own subordinate manufacturers. We learned this at the last interrepublic wholesale fair where they, instead of preventing their

subordinate ministries from reducing commodity resources allocated for the market, themselves did not fully accept the assignments for production of goods established by planning bodies. This was the position taken at the fair by the Ministry of Automotive Industry and the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems. But they should act on behalf of all of their co-performers at the fair and, together with USSR Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of Trade, determine the volumes of delivery of goods for whose production they are responsible.

[Yu. Boyev, chief of the production administration of the Ministry of Heavy and Transportation Machine Building]: Our ministry is not a head ministry. We are a "contractor" for 22 head ministries and produce about 700 types of goods, including the Malyutka washing machine, all kinds of pots and pans, and many souvenirs. But we are not receiving any help from our leaders in studying the market situation and determining prospects for development of the assortment and improving the quality of goods. On the contrary, by instituting excessive standardization the Ministry of Light Industry, for example, creates additional difficulties in the production of goods that are in demand. For example, our Uralmash [Ural Machine] Plant is building capacities to produce 200,000 Malyutka washing machines a year. We are producing 80,000 a year because of a shortage of materials. It would seem that the head ministry has the cards in its hand and should help us settle the question of material-technical supply. But instead of this, we recently received a letter from its managers in which they "gave their blessing" to the modernized Malyutka and ordered it written off. This sentence was delivered by employees of the All-Union Scientific Research and Experimental Design Institute of Electrical Appliances. Our original and inexpensive design, it appears, does not fit within the parametric series of washing machines they had developed.

Needless to say, not all head ministries implement uniform technical policy in that way. Recently, for example, the quality of domestic televisions, radios, and tape recorders has improved. Considerable credit for this goes to the Ministry of Communications Equipment Industry, the head ministry for these products. It works together closely with all its allied sectors to improve domestic radio electronic goods.

[A. Kuz'mitskiy, deputy minister of the communications equipment industry]: We are coordinating the production of our types of goods by means of a system for comprehensive study and prediction of the demand for domestic radio electronics goods. For our co-performers we determine exactly when goods must be produced, what kind, and how many. And no false rumors at all arise on the subject. For example, colored and black-and-white television sets are manufactured by the enterprises of foreign ministries, but the balance based on number, assortment, and quality of these goods is worked out by our ministry. In this case we perform not only coordination but also inspection functions. The sectorial scientific research institute has organized a state testing center and we not only test all new television models, but also recommend, and sometimes simply order, which models are to be withdrawn and which are to be put into production. The same thing is true for tape recorders and amplifiers.

[A. Meshchankin, chief of the department of cultural-domestic goods of USSR Gosplan]: The reputation and respect enjoyed by the head ministry is one of the conditions for successful exercise of its authority. It is difficult to imagine a head ministry in the role of general supplier without this. Before the wholesale market USSR Gosplan gives the USSR Ministry of Trade production volumes in a breakdown only for a limited number of goods. The rest is a calculated assortment or cost indicators. Gosplan is not able to reconcile the production of all goods in physical terms with the USSR Ministry of Trade. This is the function of the head ministry. Needless to say, it is easier to perform it if the head ministry sets the tone both by the share of its output in total deliveries and by the quality of its goods.

[Yu. Boldyrev, chief arbitrator of the USSR Ministry of Trade]: It is apparent that adjustments must be made in the distribution of "spheres of influence." The ministry which cannot control things in the market for its goods cannot be a head ministry in form or reality. The institution of head ministries has been used for more than 10 years. Many things that were not clear at first are now obvious. It is time to summarize our accumulated experience and publish a document which defines the rights and obligations of head ministries. In addition to the rights that follow logically from its responsibilities, the head ministry needs rights that are written down and fixed in a legal document.

[A. Meshchankin]: There is a draft of such a document. It designates the authority and responsibility of head ministries, specifically establishing the procedures for their participation in planning. It contemplates a precise determination of their rights with respect to coordinating, standardizing, and specializing production. It is important for the decisions of head ministries to be in fact mandatory for all enterprises engaged in the production of the particular commodity. We cannot tolerate the situation where each department determines the assortment of goods at its own discretion. There are some 40 models of washing machines on the market, for example. Twenty-eight plants manufacture them. As a result, there are dozens of different types of motors and mountings for them. The same thing is true of vacuum cleaners. There are many models, but all the designs are 10 years old. In this situation the main job of the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances, the head organization for this equipment, is certainly not to simply compile parametric series of machines, but rather to make decisions with its co-performers on what should be produced and how much at the enterprises of the particular department, taking into account production capacities and consumer needs.

[G. Kazanskiy, deputy minister of radio industry]: The quicker a statute is published that defines the role of the head ministries, the better. Without this it is difficult to balance the plan for production of cultural goods with development of capacities and consumption of materials and assembly components. Last year our television plants lost about 1 million norm-hours because they did not have the necessary assemblies, which are manufactured by another ministry. And then they did not receive a special wire which was supposed to be supplied by a third ministry. Therefore, we need comprehensive target programs by areas of work. They should be developed by the head ministries together with USSR Gosplan. But no matter what functions the ministry may have,

the technical level, sophistication, and organization of the production of consumer goods at leading and subordinate enterprises must meet contemporary requirements.

[A. Orlov, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for the Study of Public Demand for Consumer Goods and Market Conditions]: To compile a plan for the production of cultural goods for 5-10 years in advance head ministries must thoroughly study the market and determine its prospects from the standpoint of development of the assortment. According to our estimates, it should be possible to add 10-12 billion rubles worth of new goods to commodity circulation before 1985. But who will say exactly what goods they should be? In what volume? In what series? With what consumer qualities? Only the head ministry can say. It should have this information and include it in the plan.

[A. Dzhanoyan, chief of the technical administration of the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry]: I would like to return to the discussion about the right of a head ministry to ban the production of goods that do not meet contemporary requirements or to curtail their production. In my opinion, it should be not so much directive as economic. For example, our organization and the USSR State Committee for Standards are participating in certification of all the products assigned to us. Our proposals, as the head organization, are taken as the basis. We use this lever to make certain corrections in the structure of goods production. But if we want to make this structure closer to public demand, the head ministries must be given the right to recommend prices for products that are being certified. For example, take soldering irons. Several dozen types and classes of them are manufactured. There are some that cost just a ruble and 40 kopecks, while others cost seven rubles. Of course, we could simply ban the production of soldering irons at the local industry enterprise in Bendery, for example. But this would be incorrect. The employees of this enterprise manufacture products of that quality that can be achieved under local conditions and they make use of waste materials from other production. Naturally, the quality of their products may be lower than that of products produced by enterprises in our sector. Therefore, it would be more correct if, when certifying soldering irons made in Bendery, we did not ratify them in the highest quality category, and assigned a price of one ruble 50 kopecks, instead of three rubles. Then as long as the trade system orders them and sells them, let the enterprise produce them.

[Yu. Podobed, deputy chief of the technical administration of the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances]: Our ministry is the head organization for 29 types of domestic appliances, and 15 of them are complex devices. Practically all of the production facilities were organized before our ministry was formed. Under these conditions it is very difficult to implement a uniform technical policy when the rights of the head ministry have not been codified in the law. We have been criticized here because we do not always work well with our co-performers and coordinate their activities, and it is said that as a result the assortment of goods expands but does not improve. As for the development of standard and unified designs we have no problems. But when you begin to put these designs into production, problems arise everywhere. I will give just one example. Specialists at

VNIIEKIEMP [possibly All-Union Scientific Research and Experimental Design Institute of Electrical Machine Production] in Kiev developed standardized model series of vacuum cleaners that are produced by our enterprises and subordinate enterprises. A carefully worked-out program for the development of production of vacuum cleaners and assembly components for them was written and discussed with our co-performers. Among them, to be specific, the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry is to participate. But then just recently I received a letter from my respected colleague Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dhanoyan, who is present here today. The letter read as follows: "The Technical Administration of the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry, following the protocol of the meeting at the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances on 10 September 1980, has reviewed the draft decision on development and incorporation of a parametric series of base models of vacuum cleaners. The questions of the development and manufacture of experimental models of new assembly components for the vacuum cleaners are decided in proper fashion. But the question of incorporation of series production of these products in the required volumes should be decided by planning agencies through the creation of specialized capacities." I ask you, how can the decisions of head ministries be mandatory for all "subordinate" organizations if everything relies on USSR Gosplan? There is only one answer, give the head ministries the right to plan production of goods in their own "sector" or our proposals in this area should be the foundation for decisions by USSR Gosplan. With the "toothless authority" we have been given we remain nothing but consultants.

[A. Romanov, deputy chief of the technical administration of the USSR State Committee for Standards]: In all cases, of course, USSR Gosplan should plan the production of goods. But it is the job of the head ministry to provide the organizational base for planning.

The head ministries have a tool with which they can insure planning agencies against the costs of lack of departmental coordination. This is comprehensive standardization. If the head ministry has a state standard for the procedures of developing new articles and putting them into production, the system of relations with all allied workers prescribed by it acquires the force of law. We suggested that the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances put its relations with allied organizations on a legal basis by developing and ratifying a comprehensive standard for electrical household appliances. But they were not receptive to this idea. So often talk about a lack of rights in head ministries conceals a lack of desire to take on additional work.

From the Editors

The institution of head ministries, which was expected to help planning agencies coordinate the production of domestic and household goods, is serving its purpose. It is impossible not to see the organizing role of the head ministries in the fact that the quality of household goods improved, the assortment expanded, and the volume of production increased in the Ninth and 10th Five-Year plans. All

participants in the meeting agreed with this conclusion. However, the state of the market for certain goods plainly reveals poor coordination among manufacturers. By no means all the head ministries have become established in their roles. Their co-performers continue to work independently, and therefore not always successfully, on development and specialization of production and improvement of the assortment and quality of goods.

Thus, there is a critical need for a document which will define not only the obligations of the head ministries, but also their rights. It is perfectly obvious that it should legally establish the powers favored by the participants in the round table discussion. This will make it possible to identify the status of the head ministries more clearly and strengthen their influence on the organization of production at the enterprises of related co-performing sectors.

11,176

CSO: 1827/53

CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

GOSPLAN OFFICIAL ARGUES FOR SMALLER LIGHT INDUSTRY ENTERPRISES

Moscow SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA in Russian 13 Mar 81 p 2

[Article by Ye. Afanasy'evskiy, sector chief in the Council for Study of Productive Forces of USSR Gosplan: "Is the Mania for Giant Plants Justified?"]

[Text] Light industry today operates many very large enterprises. There are enormous complexes employing 8,000-10,000 persons, sometimes even more, in virtually all economic regions of the country. They were built to provide a model for their smaller "relatives," to set an example of how to raise labor productivity and reduce the prime cost of output.

But the experience of the Ninth and 10th five-year plans showed graphically that the giants often do not fulfill this role. Many of them regularly appear on the list of enterprises that are behind plans and, in general, they seem to be just "limping along."

I will give a few figures. The largest cotton fabric combines (3,000 weaving machines and more each) have 44.7 percent of all the machinery in the sector, but they produce only 39.8 percent of the total amount of fabrics. Hypothetical losses here reach some 1 billion square meters of cotton fabrics. What is the matter?

As very simple analysis shows, worker transience is much higher at the large enterprises, 20 percent and more, and equipment downtime is double and triple the norm. In all, machinery at the giant plants operates 600-800 hours a year (or 12-15 percent) less than at medium-sized factories. The reason is that the capacities of the enterprises are disproportionate to the potential of the work force under contemporary conditions. It is much harder for a giant plant given the current labor shortage.

Another negative aspect must also be taken into account. It takes at least 10 years to build the combines, and 10 more years to incorporate the capacities that have been built. The capital investment in them is frozen for a long time.

Where did the giant plants come from? Why did we begin building them? They appeared as an objective result of the pattern of concentration of production.

But only technical and technological needs and potential were made paramount in this case. The very concept of "optimal enterprise size" was considered to be the result of engineering-technical calculations of the interlinking of the equipment, where the next giant plant would be located, in what populated points, and whether the specific city or community would have sufficient work force to "put the plant on its feet" — sometimes these questions were not given adequate thought, and we can now see the results.

Technical progress and the further concentration associated with it are not in themselves the goal of socialist production. They are a means to raising its economic efficiency. Therefore, when giant enterprises ran into major difficulties, the challenge was to modify the forms of production organization and switch to different types and sizes of enterprises. As far back as the Ninth Five-Year Plan scientists developed new, modern types of factories and principles for siting them. They believed that it would be most profitable to single out particular stages in the manufacture of output as independent production sectors. In their view light industry was one of the most labor-intensive sectors of the economy, employing chiefly women. For this reason they proposed that instead of giant combines a system of factories be set up on the cluster principle. Each branch of the cluster would be an enterprise specializing in definite technological operations, but taken together they would be an association that produces the final product.

Are there problems with this form of production organization? Yes, there are. It is common knowledge that it costs less to build one giant plant than several smaller factories of equal total capacity. Thus, increasing the size of enterprises in light industry by 10 times reduces specific capital expenditures by 10-20 percent. Furthermore, it is much simpler to manage a single combine where all the shops are gathered under one roof. With the cluster arrangement of factories, by contrast, additional expenditures are necessary for transportation, which is a kind of extension of the conveyor lines of technologically specialized enterprises.

But what are the advantages? There is only one advantage, but today it outweighs all the disadvantages. This form of territorial concentration of enterprises enables the sector to adapt flexibly to the level of employment of the population and socioeconomic and demographic conditions. It makes it possible to use labor resources more efficiently. Moreover, these factories are built and incorporated 3-4 times faster than large combines.

But in the 10th Five-Year Plan practically no such clusters of factories were built as recommended by scientists. The need for them is so great that in our Union republics work was begun to set up a whole network of branches of existing enterprises and associations in small cities, rayon centers, and large towns. In Armenia, for example, more than 56 branches and sections were organized and employed a total of more than 8,000 persons. SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA has already written about this. They build the branches by in-house means at best, but usually they are opened in spare rooms of old school buildings, clubs, and so on where it is impossible to create good working conditions. Therefore, these production units are, unfortunately, temporary.

This is a shame. During the 10th Five-Year Plan the branches helped the Armenian SSR Ministry of Light Industry increase the volume of production by almost 50 percent compared to 17 percent for the USSR Ministry of Light Industry as a whole. If the branches had been well constructed this success could have been reinforced. Indeed, it must be reinforced and expanded, and there is just one way to do this — emphasize the establishment of clusters of enterprises and branches of associations and at the same time stop financing construction of enormous combines and expansion of existing giant enterprises. This is exactly how the capital investment appropriated for the sector in the 11th Five-Year Plan should be used.

Meanwhile State Planning Institute No 1 of the USSR Ministry of Light Industry in 1980 prepared technical-economic substantiation for the construction of a mammoth cotton fabric combine in the little city of Dobryanka in Permukaya Oblast. Its cost is about 700 million rubles. The sector has never before built such a large project.

That is not all. Just recently the same planning institute issued substantiation for construction of another giant plant in the little city of Kozlovka in Chuvashskaya ASSR. It is contemplated that both combines will be built in the 11th Five-Year Plan. It seems that their past mistakes did not teach the leaders of the textile sector anything.

Of course, the problem of siting new construction must be solved concretely in every case, depending on the working conditions of the future enterprise. If it is more profitable to build a large combine in certain places, let it be done. But if the city where it is to be built is small, has few workers, and it is difficult to expect a large influx of workers, we should consider whether it is worth building an enormous light industry enterprise there. Perhaps it would be better to build several small factories and join them in an association.

Light industry produces half of all the nonfood consumer goods. Shortcomings in its work have a major impact on normal supply to the population. Conversely, any reserve put into use results in additional production of fabrics, clothes, footwear, and other things that people need so much. The transition to building small specialized enterprises and branches within light industry production associations is a crucial means of meeting the challenge set down by the 26th CPSU Congress: develop the production of consumer goods at a fast pace.

CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN ESTABLISHING, RUNNING FACTORY FARM

Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by L. Alimpiyev, Director, Aktyubinsk Agricultural Machine Building Plant: "Problems With the Factory Farm"]

[Text] On 25 January of this year we published an article entitled "The Enterprise's Agrarian Shop". It criticized, in particular, the slow development of subsidiary farms of the USSR Ministry of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Poultry Production.

Deputy Minister P. Tsitsin informed the editor's office that the criticism was valid. Out of 26 plants at which subsidiary farms were to be created, only 11 enterprises now have such farms. The effort was hindered in many ways by the absence of standard planning documents.

Standard plans for subsidiary farms accounting for their specialization have now been published, standard plans for pigsties of varying capacity are being drawn up with an eye on using food wastes, and a special group has been created to study and generalize the experience of the sector's leading subsidiary farms and to develop the appropriate recommendations on this basis.

P. Tsitsin reported at the same time that the sector does have a model subsidiary farm at the Aktyubinsk Agricultural Machine Building Plant, which has accumulated rich experience in development of subsidiary agriculture. Today we will discuss this farm, and the problems that arise in the path of its development.

In the course of a single summer, in 1979, not far away from Aktyubinsk, beside a busy highway on unoccupied solonchak, a cattle town came into being: paved streets, beautiful cottages made of silice brick, and typical yard buildings. There are buildings for livestock--long, silvery-roofed sheep pens, pigsties, and cow barns.

Between them are feedlots with metal fencing and shingled awnings to protect the animals from the sun, and feeders and waterers. All of this is the subsidiary farm of the Aktyubinsk Agricultural Machine Building Plant of the USSR Ministry of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production.

Last year we were visited by many guests from different oblasts of the country, and even from abroad. It is hard for the visitors to believe that our farm had been built so quickly, and that it began producing in just a little over a year.

I must confess that many doubted the feasibility of the project at its inception, and that they were concerned that money might be lost. But even they were soon persuaded that a subsidiary farm is very profitable. A sign on the front of a small building that appeared in the center of the plant territory made it known that this was where the subsidiary farm's products were to be sold. The workers of each shop come here according to a schedule to buy fresh meat and milk. Noticeable changes have also occurred in the menu of the plant dining room. Each day the subsidiary farm supplies 300 kilograms of meat and about as much milk to the collective of 3,000 people. As soon as the farm gets its strength, and its construction is completed, these figures will triple. And then the problem of providing meat to our plant will be stricken from the agenda. Such will be the contribution to the worker's table, at home and at the plant.

Many enterprises are now thinking about setting up their own subsidiary farms. But it would be naive to presume that everything will come into being on its own if you simply want it badly enough. We had to surmount many difficulties, and some problems have still not been solved.

The difficulties began in the planning stage. Planning organizations are burdened by orders from agriculture, and planning funds are limited. To make matters worse, the needs of subsidiary farms are not accounted for.

Our relationships with the bank remain complex. We go to our ministry for help. It in turn pounds the doors of the USSR All-Union Bank for the Financing of Capital Investments. The latter queries our local bank, which must confirm that the plant would be able to utilize the requested assets properly. We in turn have our own supporting arguments: We intend to do the construction on our own, using the plant's reserves, both material and human. In the end, we receive a loan of 3 million rubles, and now we have no doubts that we will begin to pay our debt starting in 1982.

Much depends on the help the State Bank can provide. Long-term loans for acquisition of farm animals and short-term loans for the purchase of feed are required. Incidentally, we are able to increase the numbers of our sheep and pigs by keeping the surplus of young animals for ourselves. We found the solution in that regard. But things are worse with cattle--we have to make purchases in other oblasts.

Our limited agricultural experience has persuaded us that if animal husbandry products are to be supplied regularly, possession of three types of farm animals is mandatory--sheep, pigs, and cattle. For example, after the new year we would no longer slaughter sheep, since they would provide 18 tons of wool in spring. We also need to concern ourselves with the dairy herd, even though beef production is still our main objective. The fact is that calves, piglets, and even lambs born in winter need milk. This is why we maintain 150 milking cows.

Everyone knows that feed is the main problem in animal husbandry. Using land not suited to general farming, and solonchak, we raise winter wheat, oats, Sudan-grass, and silage corn. We have learned to use straw effectively. There is little of it in our area, and we are astounded on learning that it is simply burned in other places. We use it as litter for the animals in limited quantities--it all goes into the feed bag. Unfortunately, it is very hard for us to get concentrated feed.

We do not encounter any special problems with agricultural equipment, with the reception of tractors and trucks. We have not been able to resolve the issue of obtaining them centrally from our ministry's motor pool. And as a result, our demand is far from fully satisfied.

The ministries of the machine building sectors are now setting up headquarters and working groups which are dealing to some extent with the problems associated with developing subsidiary farms at subordinated enterprises. I feel that we should make use of the experience acquired by the ministries of coal, petroleum, and gas industry, which possess worker supply sections staffed by agricultural specialists.

With time, after the subsidiary farm gets up on its own feet, we will organize an independent balance for it. Most accounting is needed in many respects: Accounting and control will improve, production effectiveness and product quality will rise, and measures to materially stimulate the livestock breeders will be implemented more broadly.

Our plant was awarded a diploma of the AUCCTU for being the best subsidiary farm. This honor has not caused us to relax--the subsidiary farm continues to expand, and to gain strength.

11004

ISSN: 1027/99

CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

GEORGIAN PRODUCT QUALITY PERFORMANCE DECLINES

Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian 15 Apr 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Product Quality is Everybody's Business!"]

[Text] In the accountability report of the CPSU CC to the 26th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev devoted much attention to urgent economic problems in the 1980s and the 11th Five-year Plan, noting: "Another factor is the level of standards imposed on product quality. I believe these standards should be higher, to match the best world and Soviet standards; we cannot and should not tolerate anything less. We must grow accustomed to this; we must fight for it and decisively reject everything that is outmoded and backward, everything that has been devalued by life itself."

In general, the matter of product quality improvement runs like a red thread through our party's economic policy; this is only logical. The resolution of the main task of the 11th Five-year Plan--that of enhancing the Soviet people's well being--will largely depend on sharply improving product quality.

"To conduct the economy in an economical manner," said Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze at the recent Georgian party aktiv meeting, "entails enhancing product reliability, durability, and quality. All such problems are of vital national importance, of great political importance."

It was also noted at the party aktiv that the new terms governing product certification severely constrain the republic. Indeed, compared with the 10th Five-year Plan's indicators we are not in very good shape in this regard. According to the GSSR Central Statistical Administration's first quarter figures, products bearing the State Emblem of Quality totaled 12.5 percent of overall production output. Only 183 out of 882 enterprises are making products bearing the emblem. In that time only 269.4 million rubles worth of top-category goods have been produced. The above figures indicate that 20.3 percent of the enterprises in the republic are supplying customers with products bearing the State Emblem of Quality.

Why is it that first-quarter top-category product plans have not been met by the Secondary Nonferrous Metals Administration, the Rustavi Crane Plant, Gruzvinmashina, the Tbilisi Dinamo Sports Club's Knitwear Factory, and the Society for the Deaf? This situation has come about because a number of ministries and enterprises, and especially their officials, have slackened efforts to improve quality indicators

and have failed to prepare in time for product certification. Why is it, for example, that out of a planned 410,000 [?] rubles worth of top-category products the Agriculture Ministry has not produced a single ruble's worth?

The quality of some ministries and enterprises is also indicated by the fact that many product items are losing the State Emblem of Quality. Production associations, plants, factory, and machine officials, party organization bodies and committees, should not have to be reminded that any product--an electric locomotive, an article of clothing, an automobile, or electric appliance is awarded the Emblem of Quality for a certain length of time, and when the time runs out it must be recertified,

but the saddest thing is that, all too often, our enterprise administrations and party organizations abandon the struggle for quality. For example, top-category products are being turned out by only 15 out of 35 enterprises in the republic's Construction Materials Industry Ministry and 38 out of 55 enterprises in the Ligne Industry Ministry. The situation needs to be sharply improved in the other ministries as well.

The share of products bearing the Emblem of Quality in the overall output of some production associations, plants, and factories is just a drop in the bucket, as the saying goes. This is true, in particular, of the Rustavi Crane Plant and Steel and Tube Plant, whose top-category output comes to 2.8 and 1.9 percent, respectively.

Great fundamental importance attaches to the task of enhancing product quality and reliability. It is time now to turn from quantity to quality indicators, to learn from the country's and the republic's leading enterprises how to manage production, to use the example of collectives who have made the struggle for quality their prime concern and have achieved remarkable success. They include the collective of Gruzskhromskaya. More than 80 percent of the association's products bear the Emblem of Quality. The same high indicators have been achieved by collectives of the Tbilisi Vagon Electric Welding Machinery Plant, the Tbilisi Kalinin Casting Machinery Plant, the Rustaveli Grubskel Plant, the Pali Elektroparaplat Plant, the Soviet Organizational Automotive Plant, and the Tbilisi Elva Scientific-Production Association.

We must approach the struggle to improve quality in an integrated manner; we must work on this problem consistently and with all seriousness and institute strict party supervision over it. Surely, no one can achieve improved quality indicators if they give no thought to the perfection of technological processes and the renaissance of equipment, if they fail to promote socialist competition in every way to have workers accepted as first submission, to gain the right to have one's personal stamp, to strengthen responsibility for technical monitoring, and to apply and enforce production standards. Consequently, every enterprise must have an integrated plan with regard to product quality improvement and strictly comply with it.

Product quality improvement is an urgent matter. We cannot avert our attention to it for a minute. Deans, professors, rectors, and ispalaks of Soviets of People's Deputies must supervise the work of enterprises in their jurisdiction so that they can accomplish substantial results in the struggle to improve product quality in the shortest possible time.

Let us not forget that increasing the share of products bearing the Emblem of Quality in the republic's overall production output is a matter of prime importance. Our task is not only to avoid falling below the accomplishments made by our working class in the 10th Five-year Plan but also to consolidate them, to step up our efforts for quality and be concerned for our republic's prestige, to uphold the honor of our enterprises, and to constantly implement the plans mapped out by the 26th CPSU Congress and the 26th GCP Congress. Among the obligations assumed by the enterprise collectives to provide a worthy greeting to the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Soviet rule and the formation of the Communist Party in Georgia, improving quality indicators must be a key point.

8354

2001 1813/068

CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

GEORGIA RISKS LOSING 'QUALITY EMBLEM' STATUS

Official KOMUNISTI in Georgian 15 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by GGP CC Industry Department Head B. Makharashvili: "Effectiveness and Quality Are the Main Tasks of the 1980s"]

[Text] The 20th CPSU Congress launched the next stage in the implementation of the party's Leninist course to create the material-technical base of a communist society.

The 10th Five-year Plan is characterized by more than a significant growth in the economic potential. Our country has entered a new stage of economic development. The fundamental characteristic of this stage is that quality factors now come to the forefront in economic development. The CPSU CC's accountability report to the 20th party congress states that products must be of top quality. "A match for the best world and Soviet standards," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "We cannot and should not tolerate anything less. We must become accustomed to this, we must fight the talk, we must decisively reject everything that is outmoded, backward, everything that has been devalued by life itself."

The 20th CPSU Congress also devoted much attention to matters of further enhancing the effectiveness and quality of all our work.

In the past five-year period our industry was successful in improving product quality, and now the products of many enterprises have won great prestige not only in our republic and country but also on foreign markets.

At the start of the 10th Five-year Plan Georgia was near the bottom among the union republics with regard to producing goods bearing the State Emblem of Quality. By the end of the five-year plan we had advanced to second place. In the first year of the five-year plan, the republic's industry turned out 197 million rubles worth of products bearing the Emblem of Quality. In the final year this output stood at 1.6 billion. Overall, 4.9 billion rubles worth of top-category goods were produced in the 10th Five-year Plan.

A number of product items of vital importance to the economy were submitted for the Emblem of Quality for the first time in the 10th Five-year Plan, including the KAM-508 truck, manganese, ferroalloy steel pipe, transformers, computers, construction components, and so on.

Consumer goods account for most of the total volume of goods bearing the State Emblem of Quality. Some 1.2 billion rubles worth of such goods--about 20 percent of the total--were produced in 1980 alone.

It is significant to note that many of the republic's ministries, departments, and enterprises have much better indicators than the corresponding all-union ministries and departments with regard to the share of products bearing the State Emblem of Quality. In the enterprises of the Petroleum and Chemical Industry Ministry located in Georgia, for example, the share of top-quality products stands at 51.6 percent, whereas the average all-union indicator within the same ministry is 38.5 percent. Again, in our enterprises which belong to the USSR Ferrous Metallurgy Ministry system the share of top-quality products stands at 23 percent, whereas the average all-union indicator is 18.4. In USSR Automotive Industry Ministry enterprises located in the republic this indicator is 60.8 percent, versus the all-union average of 37 percent, and so on.

Matters of raising the technical level and improving the quality of goods are always at the center of attention of the republic's party organization. Efforts along these lines are under way in all sectors of industry, and as a result the quality of goods produced by Georgia's enterprises is constantly improving.

Leading enterprises of Tbilisi, Batumi, Kutaisi, Rustavi, Zestaponi, Chiatura, Gori, Khashuri, Kaspi, and elsewhere took on the obligation to boost the share of products bearing the State Emblem of Quality to 50 percent or more. The initiators of this pledge, and many of their followers, are already close to this goal, and some have surpassed it.

The new rules governing certification that are in force starting with 1981 restrict the list of products that can be submitted for the State Emblem of Quality. For example, food products, perfumes and cosmetics, gold products, and many kinds of consumer goods are not eligible for certification.

The situation has grown even more complex since the ministries and departments drew up their lists of products for certification. It turns out that many enterprises are losing the possibility of submitting their goods for the Emblem of Quality because these products are not on the list.

As a result, the production of goods bearing the State Emblem of Quality in the republic's industrial enterprises has dropped sharply both in terms of the number of items and in terms of volume. At the start of the 11th Five-year Plan, 326 of Georgia's enterprises were producing 2320 items bearing the Emblem of Quality; now, 207 enterprises are producing 1538 such items.

In 1980, the republic's industry was turning out an average of 150 million rubles worth of emblem-bearing goods monthly. In January of this year our industry produced 70 million rubles worth--in other words, only half as much. The situation was no better in February.

A tough situation has developed. It will require both diligent study and a creative approach to the problem of putting existing reserves and capabilities to work in order to increase the output of top-quality goods. Preliminary calculations indicate that at the start of 1981 the volume of goods bearing the Emblem of Quality in the republic is only 10.5 percent.

Certain ministries, departments, and enterprises either cannot or will not resolve matters of improving production and enhancing effectiveness and quality in an integrated manner. Otherwise, how to explain the fact that for this year and for the five-year plan as a whole their plans call for minimum growth in the output of top-category goods. The Tbilisi Fashion Footwear Factory, for example, plans to increase its top-quality output from 4.5 to 4.6 million rubles. The Tbilisi School Equipment Factory plans a rise from 0.3 to 0.35 million. The Kutaisi Silk Association plans a rise from 18 to 18.7 million. The Batumi Oil Refinery's plans call for a rise from 75.8 to 75.9 million. The Sukhumi Chemical Plant plans a rise from 0.05 to 0.06 million. And so on.

These enterprises are obviously planning easy targets. This is proved, for example, by their performance in January, when Gruzbytkhim and the Kutaisi Lithopone Plant almost tripled their top-quality output plan.

Another group of enterprises, for some reason, plan to produce top-category goods only in the final years of the 11th Five-year Plan. These include Gruzsel'khodz mashina, the Tbilisi Gas Equipment Plant, the Shorapani Elektroelement Plant, the Kutaisi Small Tractor Plant, the Sukhumi Furniture Factory, the Tskhinvali Mechanical Plant, the Zugdidi Training-Production Association, and others.

We also have a number of enterprises (the Tskhinvali City Industrial Combine, the Gori Rayon Industrial Combine, the Samtredia Wood Processing Combine), which are apparently content with what they've accomplished and do not have any plans to increase their output of top-category goods, and the Madneuli Mining-Concentration Combine, the Kvaisi Lead and Zinc Mine Administration, and Gruzugol' do not plan to produce any top-quality goods at all in the five-year plan.

And there are even enterprises that have planned to reduce their output of goods bearing the Emblem of Quality. They include the Zestaponi Ferroalloy Plant, the Chiatura Manganese Combine, and others.

Improving industrial product quality inevitably entails raising the level of scientific-research and project-design work. We can judge this from the performance of one of our biggest scientific-production associations--Analizpribor. In the 10th Five-year Plan this association put new types of machinery, equipment, instruments, and automation devices into production. The new products are distinguished from their predecessors by greater durability, reliability, and economy.

But not all scientific-research and project-design institutes are doing as well.

The matter of increasing the output of goods bearing the Emblem of Quality is directly linked to the adoption of integrated quality control systems. Progress has been made in this regard. But the adoption of integrated quality control

systems has hardly paid off at all. There are about 900 industrial enterprises in the republic. Some 321 of them have adopted integrated quality control systems, and 150 are in the process, although it is incomprehensible why the adoption process has dragged on so long.

Consequently, 471 enterprises, more or less, have product quality control systems. So why are only 326 enterprises producing goods bearing the Emblem of Quality (only 207 under the new regulations)?

Often the approach to setting up such a system is merely perfunctory; enterprise managers are unconcerned about the results; party organizations fail to monitor this vital effort.

Tbilisi and then Kutaisi were the first in the country to develop and adopt territorial and city quality control systems. The adoption of these systems has resulted in significant improvement in the interaction of quality control organs at all levels, and their duties, rights, and responsibilities are allocated more rationally.

In the successful implementation of the complex of measures called for by the Tbilisi and Kutaisi systems, a definite role is assigned to the Tbilisi and Kutaisi raykoms and primary party organizations, which must constantly and purposefully perfect the organization of the adoption of scientific and technical advances in production and strengthen their supervision over this vital effort.

We need to eliminate shortcomings in the long-range planning of product quality improvement. We must ensure that soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, Gosstandart organs, all economic and social organizations, raykoms, and rayon soviets and offices under them take active, constant part in this matter.

The adoption of integrated systems should promote fundamental improvements in the quality of consumer goods. Only goods bearing the Emblem of Quality should be produced. Good, attractive consumer items should bring joy and cheerfulness to the home, and this should be a point of professional pride and honor for those involved in producing consumer goods.

The following fact must be mentioned. The Tbilisi city quality control system was the first in the country. But now there are many similar territorial systems in operation in the country, and in some places they are being designed and adopted at a much faster pace. The Moscow and Latvian systems, for example, are yielding a much bigger payoff. Therefore, Tbilisi and Kutaisi must step up their efforts in order to keep first place in terms of results. Moreover, the time has come to begin to design and adopt similar territorial systems in Batumi, Sukhumi, Tskhinvali, and other regions.

And another thing. The adoption of an effectiveness and quality control system at some level or other is not a short-lived campaign. Such systems must be constantly refined in accordance with the latest advances in science and technology, their effectiveness must be enhanced continually.

We must not forget that even the most advanced system must be continually refined, otherwise it will end up hindering innovation and progress.

What must be done, specifically? Above all, ministry, department, association, and enterprise officials must act jointly with quality and effectiveness commissions to immediately direct competent specialists at all party and economic levels to review long range plans of product quality improvement that have already been drawn up. Every enterprise, and the region as a whole, must take on additional obligations which will ensure that the republic preserves the gains it made in the past five-year plan. In this effort we must proceed on the basis of the new certification regulations.

The republic has taken on the obligation to raise the output of goods bearing the State Emblem of Quality to 20 percent in the 11th Five-year Plan. But in order to keep our lead position in the country, all organizational and political work in the collectives must aim at a target of 25 percent by the end of the five-year plan.

The quality commissions attached to the gorkoms and raykoms must work with the enterprises with the aim of getting the maximum assortment of goods certified and awarded the Emblem of Quality. Special attention must be focused on new goods-- they must be ready for Quality Emblem certification as soon as they go into production. On the average, two hundred new items go into production every year. In order to revise the new obligations adopted with regard to the production of top-quality goods (by individual years of the five-year period), the effectiveness and quality commissions must examine them and submit them to the GCP CC's Republic Quality and Effectiveness Commission.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 26th GCP Congress impose substantial tasks on the republic's industry. In the 11th Five-year Plan, everyone must work under the motto "Maximum Volume of Top-Category Goods!"

To reach this goal, workers in industry, officials of enterprises and organizations, ministries, and departments, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, primary party organizations, and quality commissions on all levels must step up organizational-party efforts to eliminate existing shortcomings and tap reserves for raising technical levels and improving product quality.

Local party committees must hold regular buro meetings to hear reports by quality commission officials, examine matters of improving product quality, map out ways to eliminate shortcomings, and institute strict supervision over the implementation of decisions that have been made.

The press, radio, television, and all the other media must make better efforts to publicize the general struggle to improve product quality and get the working people involved in mass collective quality control.

Ensuring high product quality and raising technical levels constitute one of the republic's most vital tasks in the 11th Five-year Plan.

6854

CSO: 1813/068

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

13 JULY 1981